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Abstract
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1.  Introduction
One of the difficulties in addressing the environmental problems associated with livestock waste
is that manure can pollute multiple media (air, water, and soil) along multiple dimensions. Air
quality  concerns  related  to  manure  include  odorous  gases  (ammonia  and  hydrogen  sulfide),
particulate  material  (by-products  of  ammonia),  and  greenhouse  gases  (methane  and  nitrous
oxide). Water pollutants from manure include nitrogen, phosphorus, antibiotics, and pathogens.
The theory of the second best demonstrates that the correction of a single market distortion
without simultaneously  correcting other sources of market failure can lead to  Pareto-inferior
resource allocations (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956).   The theory implies that policies to address
pollution in a single medium could worsen pollution in other media, resulting in lower societal
welfare. This paper considers the economic and environmental implications of regulating both
water and air nitrogen emissions under single-environmental medium and coordinated multi-
environmental media policies. Particular attention is paid to tradeoffs that occur when policies
are designed to correct an externality in one medium without considering externalities in other
media.
The  Environmental  Protection  Agency  has  recently  introduced  regulations  for
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) under the Clean Water Act.  These regulations
require,  among  other  things,  that  CAFOs  applying  manure  to  land  meet  nutrient  application
standards defined by a Comprehensive Nutrient Management Plan (USEPA, 2003).  To help
defray the costs of the meeting the new regulations, producers can apply for financial assistance
from the USDA’s Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP).  Producers can receive up
to  $450,000  per  farm  during  2002-2007  to  help  them  develop  and  implement  a  nutrient
management plan, and to transfer and apply manure to land in an approved manner (USDA,
NRCS, 1999; Ribaudo and Cattaneo, 2004).
Neither State nor  Federal  governments currently regulate nitrogen air  emissions from
livestock  production.  However,  ammonia  nitrogen  emissions  could  conceivably  be  regulated
under  the  PM2.5  particulate  standard  of  Clean  Air  Act,  since  ammonia  is  a  precursor  for
ammonium particles, a source of haze (NRC, 2003). Animal Feeding Operations are the largest
source of ammonia emissions in the U.S.  The PM2.5 standard has withstood court challenges
and will go into effect December 2005.3
Some  past  research  has  considered  the  effect  of  livestock  production  across  multiple
environmental media. Innes (2000) develops a spatial model of regional livestock production and
three  associated  externalities:  spills  from  animal  waste  stores,  nutrient  runoff  from  excess
application of manure to croplands, and ambient pollution. Innes models the regulation of waste
storage lagoon ‘quality’, the number of animals in the production facility, or the distance of
facilities to one another.  An important premise of Innes’ analysis is that regulators are unable to
monitor  environmental  outcomes,  including  manure  application  rates.  In  fact,  recently
implemented EPA CAFO regulations are predicated on verifiable nutrient application plans.
Feinerman, Bosch, and Pease (2003) extend Innes’ analysis by evaluating state regulatory
standards  for  manure  spreading  in  Maryland  and  Virginia.    Their  approach  uses  a  derived
manure demand function to simulate the effects of manure spreading regulations on welfare and
excess nutrient loading in soil.  In this study, we extend the scope of past analyses to consider
current  Federal  manure  spreading  regulations  and  potential  Federal  air  emission  regulations.
Specifically,  we  assess  the  environmental  and  economic  implications  of:  1)  nitrogen  land
application restrictions consistent with recently adopted EPA requirements for CAFOs under the
Clean Water Act; 2) EQIP payments available to CAFOs to mitigate costs of CAFO regulations;
3) hypothetical air quality (PM2.5) restrictions for CAFOs under the Clean Air Act; and 4) joint
manure application and PM2.5 restrictions with EQIP payments. We consider the effect of these
policies  on  both  water  quality  via  excess  soil  nutrient  applications  and  on  air  quality  via
ammonia emissions from manure storage facilities and land applications.
To assess the impact of these policy alternatives, we construct a positive mathematical
programming  model  where  producers  maximize  profits  subject  to  resource  and  regulatory
constraints. In the model, nitrogen enters through the feed ration and is retained by the animals or
excreted in manure. Once excreted, the nitrogen may be released into the atmosphere through air
emissions or contained in the manure storage and handling facility until it is applied to cropland.
Nitrogen enters cropland through commercial and manure fertilizer applications. The crop retains
some  nitrogen,  some  is  bound  in  the  soil  substrate  and  some  is  released  directly  into  the
environment  through  air  emission  and  water  runoff.  Using  relationships  from  the  scientific
literature, the level of water pollution is derived from the estimated quantity of nutrients applied
to the land and air emissions are derived from total animal production and the type of storage and
handling technology employed by the animal feeding operation. The model is calibrated with4
data  from  the  1998  USDA-ARMS  survey  of  hog  operations  using  positive  mathematical
programming (Howitt, 1995).
Results  demonstrate  that  policies  designed  to  account  for  only  one  environmental
externality may have  unintended  consequences  in  other  environmental  media.    We  find  that
imposing ammonia nitrogen standards on CAFOs in the absence of nutrient application standards
results in an increase in excess nitrogen applied to soil.  However, imposing nutrient application
standards consistent with 2003 EPA regulations  results  in  negligible changes  in  air  nitrogen
emissions.  The study also provides information about the costs and responses to farmers of
complying with joint air and soil nitrogen standards.
2. Analytic Model
For  the  policy  analysis  we  construct  a  hog  farm  model  that  captures  the  essential  tradeoffs
between  air  and  water  emissions.  The  severity  of  air  and  water  quality  degradation  from
livestock  production  depends  primarily  on  how  manure  is  stored  and  disposed  of.    The
application of manure to fields when nutrients in the manure exceed what crops can absorb has
been  associated  with  increased  algae  production,  reduced  fish  populations  and  diminished
recreational opportunities (USEPA, 1998).   Because of the high cost of transporting manure
relative to the value of the nutrients contained in the manure, farmers have an incentive to over-
apply manure to land located near their livestock facilities.  A nutrient application standard can
force farms to transport manure a significant distance from the hog facility. Farmers can reduce
manure transportation costs under an application standard by reducing the nutrient content of the
manure – allowing them to apply more manure per acre. The nutrient content of manure can be
reduced by storing it in lagoons before applying it or by surface applying it rather than injecting
it.
Ammonia emissions from manure storage facilities and from manure applied to fields
may impair air quality downwind, and contribute to soil nutrient loading through atmospheric
deposition.  Lagoons reduce manure nutrient content through the volatilization of nitrogen in the
form of ammonia.  Manure lagoons may be covered to reduce  ammonia emissions, but this
maintains the nitrogen content of the manure.  Ammonia nitrogen emissions from fields can be5
reduced through sub-surface injection of the manure.  Manure injected to the soil results in more
nitrogen being available to the crops, which reduces the amount of manure that can be applied to
a  field  under  a  nutrient  application  standard,  increasing  the  land  required  to  dispose  of  the
manure.
Positive mathematical programming (PMP) is used to calibrate the model to base year
data without having to add constraints that cannot be justified by economic theory.  PMP takes
advantage of the fact that it is easier to collect information about output and input levels at the
farm level than information about costs. The observed outputs and inputs levels result from a
complicated decision process based in part on a cost function that is known to the farmer but
difficult  or  impossible  to  observe  directly.  Some  costs  –  perhaps  associated  with  the
environment, risk, or technology – may be hidden to the researcher even when a detailed survey
instrument is available.   PMP  incorporates  information  about  unobservable  costs  by  using  a
quadratic cost function that approximates the true underlying cost function.
There  are  three  steps  to  the  PMP  calibration  (Howitt,  1995).  In  the  first  step,  a
constrained  linear  programming  model  is  used  to  derive  dual  values  associated  with  the
“calibration constraints”. In the second step, the dual values are used to parameterize a calibrated
quadratic objective function. In the third step, the calibrated model is used for economic analysis,
by imposing environmental policy constraints.
2.1 Linear program to calculate dual values.
In the first step, the linear objective is to maximize total net revenues:








where ir X1   is  the  level  of  each  output  i  in  region  r.  The  cost  of  producing  each  output  is
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jr ijr ir W A C , where  ijr A  is the amount of input j required to produce a unit of output and
jr W is the input price. The optimization is subject to  r j×  resource constraints:6
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where  ir X0  is the initial observed activity level, so that ∑
i
ir ijrX A 0 is the initial level of input j.
Inputs  include  land,  capital,  feeder  pigs,  feed  corn,  feed  soy,  and  chemical  fertilizer
nitrogen. Outputs include hogs, corn, soybeans, and “other crops” (defined as the value of all
other crops produced). All three  crops can be produced  under  three  fertilization  regimes:  1)
chemical fertilizer, 2) manure fertilizer surface applied, or 3) manure fertilizer injected into the
soil.  We use the extension of PMP developed by Röhm and Dabbert (2003) to allow for a
greater policy response between crop fertilization regimes than between crops.  To do so we
define three “variant activities” (chemical fertilizer, manure-spread, and manure-injected)  for
each crop and impose calibration constraints that distinguish between variant activities and the
total activity for each crop.  In practice, this approach results in greater substitution between, for
example,  corn  fertilized  by  spreading  manure  and  corn  fertilized  by  injecting  manure,  than
between corn and “other crop” production.
The calibration constraints for each activity are:
(3) ( ) 1 1 0 1 ε + ≤ ir ir X X , ∀ i,r  dual:  r i, ˆ λ
where  1 ε  is a small perturbation (see Howitt, 1995).  Following Röhm and Dabbert, we include
three additional calibration constraints corresponding to each set of variant activities. For corn
activities, the additional calibration constraint is:
(4) ( ) 2 1 0 1 ε + ≤∑ ∑
∈ ∈ cv i
ir
cv i
ir X X , ∀ i,r dual:  r corn, ˆ λ7
where cv is the set of corn variant activities: cv = {corn – chemical fertilizer, corn – spread
manure,  corn  –  injected  manure}.  There  are  two  additional  constraints  analogous  to  (4)
corresponding to soybean variant activities sv and other crops variant activities ov.
From the 1998 ARMS survey and other sources, we observe prices  ir P ,  ir W , the output
levels  ir X0 , and most of the input-output coefficients  ijr A  (see appendix for details).  It would be
desirable  to  include  manure  nitrogen  as  an  input.  However,  we  do  not  observe  manure
application rates, only the amount of land on which manure is applied.
2.2 Estimate calibrated quadratic cost function
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, + + = λ λ ,  ir λ ˆ   are  the  estimated  dual  values  associated  with  (3)  the
calibration  constraints,  and  r crop, ˆ λ   are  the  estimated  dual  values  associated  with  (4)  the
calibration constraints for each crop activity: crop ∈{corn, soybean, other}.  Since (4) applies
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subject to the resource constraints: 
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Solution of the non-linear optimization problem defined by (5) and (6) results in the initial output
levels  ir X0 .
2.3 Estimate activity levels for policy scenarios using calibrated cost function8
Having characterized the farmer’s non-linear optimization problem that results in the observed
initial values, the final step is to impose policy constraints and compare solutions to the initial
values.    The  policies  we  consider  are  the  CAFO  nitrogen  application  constraint  and  a
hypothetical ammonia emission constraint.  Farms can respond to policy constraints by adjusting
input and output levels. Pit storage operations can vary the amount of land on which they inject
versus surface-apply manure slurry in order to alter the  ammonia emitted to the air and the
nutrients available to plants.  Lagoon operations can cover their lagoons to reduce air ammonia
emissions.  EQIP payments enter the farmer’s decision problem by reducing costs of abiding by
the CAFO rules.
1
First we incorporate into the optimization a manure transportation cost that depends on
the  how  the  manure  is  stored  and  handled.  Prior  to  implementation  of  the  CAFO  manure
application  rules,  farmers  had  little  incentive  to  transport  manure  off-farm,  and  few  did.
According to the 1998 survey, fewer than 2% of farms transported manure off farm. The CAFO
manure application rules require farmers to apply manure at a rate that plants can absorb. In
response to the CAFO rules, farmers without adequate cropland will need to transport some
manure off-farm (Ribaudo et al, 2003).
For the policy analysis, the farmer’s objective is:
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where  r MTC  is the cost of transporting manure off-farm, which is a function of technology
choices that affect that nutrient availability to the crop – and consequently the amount of land on
which the manure must be spread. Farms eligible for EQIP payments receive a share of the
manure transportation costs and receive a per acre subsidy for land on which they apply manure
at the agronomic rate. EQIP is defined as the share of manure transportation costs financed by
EQIP.    The  per-acre  EQIP  subsidy  is  expressed  as  a  per-unit  subsidy  and  appears  in  the
optimization  as  a  higher  price  P3.    The  decision  by  lagoon  farms  to  cover  their  lagoon  is9
reflected in the binary choice variable  r COV  (1 if covered, 0 otherwise).  The cost of covering a
lagoon is simply a cost κ  per unit of hog output:  r hogs r r X COV CC , 3 ⋅ ⋅ = κ .
Manure transportation costs depend on the nutrient content of the manure (how it was
stored), how it is applied (injected or spread), on the availability of land on which to apply the
manure,  and  on  what  crops  it  is  applied.    Estimates  for  the  transportation  costs  per
hundredweight of hog are based on a transportation cost model proposed by Fleming et al (1998)
(see  appendix  for  details).    Manure  transportation  costs  equal  the  quantity  of  hogs  used  to
produce manure transported off-farm  r off hogs _  multiplied by the manure transportation costs
per hundredweight of hog.  Manure transportation costs are distinguished for lagoon operations,
which may or may not cover their lagoons:
(8)  ( ) ( ) r un r r er r r r T COV T COV off hogs MTC cov, , cov * 1 * _ − + = ,
and for pit storage operations which may inject (versus surface apply) manure into some portion
of the land on which manure is applied:
(9) ( ) ( ) r surf r r inject r r r T INJ T INJ off hogs MTC , , * 1 * _ − + = ,
where  transportation  costs  per  hundredweight  of  hog  produced  r e T ,   depend  on  the  manure
storage and handling technology  ∈ e  {covered, uncovered, surface-applied, injected}.
For  lagoon  operations,  r COV is  a  binary  choice  variable.  For  pit  storage  operations,
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1 We assume for this analysis that all CAFOs are eligible for and receive EQIP payments. In fact, farmers must
apply for EQIP payments and be accepted into the program.  In addition, EQIP may face financing constraints that
would limit payment availability. This possibility is not considered in this analysis.10
where m is the set of manure crop activities (corn, soybean and other crops, either spread or
injected) and mi is the set of all cropping activities on which manure is injected.
The  quantity  of  hogs  that  produce  manure  applied  off-farm  equals  the  total  manure
nitrogen produced times divided by the manure nitrogen available to crops per hundredweight of
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Manure transported off-farm equals total manure produced (hogs produced times manure per
hog) minus the manure that is applied on-farm:
(12)  ( ) ( ) ∑
∈
− − + ⋅ =
m i
r fertN i ir r un r r r hogs r A X manrate NH COV NH COV X off manN , , cov cov , 3 1 3 _
The manure used on farm equals the pounds of manure nitrogen applied on farm if it were
applied at an agronomic rate (the rate at which chemical fertilizers are applied) multiplied the
factor,  r manrate .  From the survey we know the average rate at which manure is applied to
receiving  land,  but  we  do  not  know  the  rate  applied  to  individual  crops.  Consequently,  we
assume that farmers apply manure at the same factor above the agronomic rate for all crops.
There are equations analogous to (11) and (12) for pit storage operations.
Policy 1: Nitrogen application constraint.  CAFO rules require a nutrient management plan that
requires growers to apply manure nitrogen at or below the rate at which plants can absorb (the
agronomic rate). This policy is imposed by constraining  r manrate  to be less than or equal to 1.
Policy 2: EQIP payments.  The effect of EQIP payments can be modeled by adjusting the share
of off-farm manure transportation costs borne by EQIP and by adjusting the per-unit subsidy for
crops produced in accordance with CAFO application guidelines.11
Policy 3: Ammonia nitrogen emission constraint.  Hypothetical ammonia emissions regulations
are modeled by imposing a limit Amlimit on the quantity of nitrogen from ammonia per-unit of
hog produced.  Nitrogen emissions per unit of hog produced e AmN depend on manure storage
and handling technologies. The ammonia emission constraint is:
(13) ( ) Amlimit AmN COV AmN COV er Un r Cover r ≤ ∗ − + ∗ cov 1
for lagoon operations and:
(14) ( ) Amlimit AmN INJ AmN INJ Surface r Inject r ≤ ∗ − + ∗ 1
for pit storage operations.  Note that the ammonia emission constraint does not depend on the
quantity of manure transported off-farm.  The application method (spread/inject) is assumed to
be the same on-farm and off-farm.
3.  Results
In the next subsection we focus on single-medium environmental policies. First we analyze the
recently  adopted  EPA  requirements  for  CAFOs  under  the  Clean  Water  Act  and  separately
consider  the  EQIP  payments  accompanying  the  CAFO  regulations.  Second,  we  consider  a
potential air quality (Pm2.5) restriction for CAFOs under the Clean Air Act – assuming the
nutrient  application  standards  had  not  been  implemented.  We  then  illustrate  environmental
tradeoffs  associated  with  these  two  single-medium  policies.  In  subsection  3.2  we  consider
implementation of multimedia environmental policies.
3.1 Single-medium environmental policies
Table 1 presents the levels of production, inputs, nitrogen to soil and air, and emission
technologies under four policy scenarios.  The outcome of each policy is compared to 1998 - the12
year of the survey to which the model is calibrated. Column 1 of table 1 shows that before
implementation of the CAFO rules, all hog manure is applied on-farm to corn, soybean, and
other crops at a rate equivalent to 7.4 times the agronomic rate on average. This very high rate
reflects the  quantity  of  manure  produced  by  farms  relative  to  the  amount  of  land  on  which
manure was spread in 1998. Initially about 10 times as much ammonia nitrogen is released from
manure storage facilities (lagoons and pits) as compared to fields.  Total nitrogen released to the
air in the form of ammonia is about twice the total quantity of manure nitrogen applied to crops
and almost three times the quantity that is not absorbed by the crops.
Column 2 presents the effect of the CAFO nitrogen soil application standard enacted in
2003.  This policy requires farmers to adhere to a nutrient management plan specifying that
nutrients are applied to crops at an agronomic rate.  The nutrient application plans effectively
eliminate excess nitrogen applied to the soil.  The nutrient application standard does induces a
slight increase in the quantity of ammonia nitrogen emitted from fields, mainly because farmers
respond to the standard by switching from injection to surface manure application techniques in
order to minimize their off-farm manure transportation costs. However, the net effect of the
policy on ammonia nitrogen emissions is a very small decline, which can be attributed mainly to
the small decline in hog production.
To conform with nutrient management plans, CAFOs increase the share of their own land
on which they apply manure, decrease the share of the land cultivated using chemical fertilizer,
and increase exports of manure off-farm.   Profits from the hog operation and total profits decline
about 4.3% and 3.6%, respectively.  The results are of the same order of magnitude to those
obtained  by  Ribaudo  et  al  (2003),  even  though  the  methodology  used  by  that  study  differs
substantially from that used here. At the farm level, Ribaudo et al estimate the net costs of
following a nutrient standard by region and farm size using a modified Fleming model  (Fleming
et al, 1998).  Their approach does not account for EQIP payments nor does it allow for optimal
farm-level response in terms of crop allocation, input levels, output levels, or production choices
such as injection versus spreading of manure. Ribaudo et al estimate that operations in the Mid-
Atlantic and South and West regions incur cost increases of about 5% while operations in Corn
Belt actually experienced declines in net costs of about 2%.
The effect of EQIP payments is shown in column 3.  EQIP is assumed to pay 50% of the
costs  of  transporting  manure  off-farm.  CAFOs  respond  to  the  lower  effective  manure13
transportation  cost  by  transporting  more  manure  off-farm,  and  by  reducing  the  substitution
between cropland under chemical and manure fertilization regimes.  EQIP also offers payments
to farmers for land cultivated according to a manure management plan. As a result, hog operation
and farm profits decline from the base level by only 2.2% and 1.4%, respectively. This is about
half the decline experienced without EQIP payments, and is equivalent to an $81 million net
benefit to farmers.
Column 4 presents the effects of an ammonia nitrogen limit applied on a per-hog output
basis.  For this analysis, ammonia nitrogen emissions are constrained to 15% above the minimum
obtainable  limit  –  the  level  obtained  by  employing  widely  available  ammonia  reducing
technologies (lagoon covers and manure injection).   For this analysis we assume there is no
CAFO manure application standard or EQIP payments.  The ammonia nitrogen standard induces
pit operations to switch manure application technique from surface-spread to injection on some
land, and it induces some lagoon operations to cover their lagoons. The standard result in a 40%
decline  in  ammonia  emissions  from  the  manure  storage  facilities  (the  largest  source  of
emissions) and a 71% increase in emission from the field, for a net decline in air ammonia of
30%. The increase in emissions from fields results because more lagoons are covered. Covering
a lagoon increases the nutrient content of the manure that is applied to the field, increasing
nitrogen volatilization.  Of particular note, the ammonia standard resulted in a dramatic 78%
increase in excess nitrogen applied to soil – revealing an important tradeoff between water and
air quality.
To explore the tradeoffs between water and air emissions in more detail we perform two
simulations. First we examine how the levels of excess soil nitrogen and ammonia nitrogen vary
for different nitrogen application standards.  Figure 1 illustrates the result of this simulation. The
application standard is relaxed incrementally from full implementation (where manure must be
applied at the agronomic rate for all crops).  As shown in figure 1, relaxing the standard by 50%
results in a large increase in the excess nitrogen applied to the soil, but almost no change in the
amount of ammonia nitrogen released. The reason for the limited response is that increasing the
soil nitrogen standard provides some incentive for farms with pit storage to surface apply rather
than inject the manure, but this effect is small. Lagoon operations have no incentive to cover
their lagoons, so there is no significant change in ammonia emission for these operations.14
The second simulation, shown in figure 2, examines how soil and air nitrogen levels
respond to varying ammonia nitrogen standards.  Moving along the x-axis, the ammonia standard
declines  from  the  minimum  ammonia  nitrogen  limit  attainable  under  widely  available
technologies (lagoon covers, and manure injection).   Relaxing the ammonia limit by 50% results
in a sizeable increase in ammonia emissions and a comparable decline in excess soil emissions.
Tightening the ammonia standard causes a large increase in excess soil nitrogen for two reasons.
First,  a  tighter  ammonia  standard  induces  more  lagoon  operations  to  cover  their  lagoons.
Because more lagoons are covered, the nutrient content of the manure is greater, resulting in
more  manure  nitrogen  available  for  crops.  Second,  a  tighter  ammonia  standard  induces  pit
operations to expand their use of manure injection as opposed to manure spreading. This increase
in manure injection also increases the nitrogen available to crops.
3.3. Multimedia environmental policies
Multimedia environmental policies may increase social welfare relative to single-medium
policies.  Figure 3 illustrates an isocost curve for a representative CAFO and two hypothetical
social  indifference  curves.    Holding  costs  equal  to  the  cost  of  imposing  only  the  nutrient
application standard S , social welfare is maximized at the soil and ammonia standards indicated
by (S*, A*).  Reflecting  the  results  of  the  simulations  discussed  above,  figure  3  shows  that
imposition  of  a  single-medium  ammonia  standard  A   results  in  an  increase  in  excess  soil
nitrogen.
For  the  same  cost  to  producers  as  the  CAFO  nutrient  application  policy  it  may  be
possible  to  design  a  coordinated  soil  and  air  regulatory  regime  that  raises  social  welfare.
However,  future  policy  decisions  are  likely  to  focus  on  the  design  of  regulations  to  reduce
ammonia  nitrogen  emissions  while  maintaining  CAFO  nutrient  application  standards.  This
analysis can provide useful information for this regulatory approach.  Figure 4 illustrates the rate
of ammonia abatement technology adoption as a function of the ammonia nitrogen standard.
Lagoon  operations  begin  to  cover  lagoons  when  the  ammonia  limit  is  below  90%  of  the
minimum ammonia limit. Below 90%, the rate of lagoon coverage increases proportionally with
the ammonia limit.  In contrast, about 47% of pit operations inject manure into the soil in the
absence of any ammonia policy.  Injection rates do not increase until the ammonia limit is about15
30% above the minimum limit, after which the injection rate increases at an increasing rate.  By
definition, all lagoon farms cover their lagoons, and all pit operations inject manure when the
ammonia limit is at the minimum level.
Figure  5  illustrates  the  ammonia  nitrogen  reduction  and  the  cost  of  this  reduction  at
varying levels of the ammonia limit.  We estimate that ammonia nitrogen can be reduced at a
minimum cost of $1.22 per pound when the ammonia limit is set at 40% above the minimum.
The cost reducing ammonia nitrogen remains less than $1.50 per pound if the ammonia limit is
set between 0-80% of the minimum.
Finally,  we consider the environmental and economic effects  of  adding the  ammonia
nitrogen emission standard evaluated in column 4 of table 1 to the 2003 CAFO-EQIP regime
evaluated in column 3.  Results of this analysis are presented in column 5 of table 1. Relative to
the single-medium soil application standard with the EQIP payments, the multimedia policy is
quite costly.  Hog operation and total farm profits decline by 10.4% and 8.6% relative to the base
year, compared to 2.2% and 1.4% without the ammonia standard.  However this policy reduces
ammonia nitrogen by about 30% relative to the levels under CAFO-EQIP alone.
4.  Conclusions
The US Environmental Protection Agency recently began enforcing regulations requiring that
CAFOs apply manure in accordance with a nutrient management plan.   These regulations are
designed to reduce excess nitrogen applied to the soil, and do not control emissions of nitrogen
in the form of ammonia from manure storage facilities and from fields on which manure has
been applied. Ammonia nitrogen emissions can cause acid rain, odor nuisances, and can react
with trace  gases  in  the  atmosphere  to  affect  particulate  matter  and  haze.  Ammonia  nitrogen
emissions could conceivably be regulated under the PM2.5 particulate standard of Clean Air Act.
This paper considered the economic and environmental implications of regulating both water and
air nitrogen emissions under single-environmental medium and coordinated multi-environmental
media policies.
Model results indicate the CAFO nutrient application standards lower hog farm profits
(returns to labor) by 3.6%. However, assuming all CAFO operations apply for and receive EQIP16
payments,  then  these  payments  reduced  CAFO  profit  losses  to  only  1.5%.    A  hypothetical
ammonia  nitrogen  standard  was  estimated  to  reduce  welfare  by  7.1%,  and  a  hypothetical
multimedia-policy incorporating both soil and air standards lowered welfare by 8.6%.  The soil
standard eliminated excess soil nitrogen and the ammonia standard reduced air emissions by
about 30%.
This study highlighted the environmental and economic tradeoffs that can occur with
single-medium  environmental  policies.    We  found  that  enforcement  of  a  single-medium
ammonia nitrogen standard induces farmers to apply more excess nitrogen to the soil - a result
likely to diminish water quality through increased nitrogen run-off and leaching.  The ammonia
standard causes an increase in excess soil nitrogen for two reasons.  First, the ammonia standard
induces some operations to cover their lagoons, which raises the nutrient content of manure.
When manure with higher nutrient content is applied to fields, more nitrogen is available for
crops.  Second, an ammonia standard induces some operations to expand their use of manure
injection as opposed to manure spreading. This increase in manure injection also increases the
nitrogen available to crops.  Because of high manure transportation costs, farmers do not fully
compensate for the additional nutrients available to crops from manure by increasing the amount
of land on which they spread manure.
The study found that imposing a single-medium nutrient application standard consistent
with the 2003 EPA regulations has only a negligible effect on ammonia nitrogen emissions.
Lagoon operations, which are initially uncovered, cannot respond in a way that exacerbates air
ammonia emissions.  Pit operations do face an increased incentive to surface apply rather than
inject the manure, but the effect on air emission is small.
The analysis considered only hog farms. Future work could incorporate dairy, livestock,
and poultry operations.  A further analysis could also include possible EQIP payments to be
associated with air emission standards.  The model developed here could also be used to estimate
the  payments  required  to  induce  operators  to  cover  their  lagoons  and  inject  manure.17
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Appendix: Variable Definitions and Sources of Data
Table A1. Initial production,  ir X0
Outputs Units Value Source
Corn fertilizer 100 bushels * USDA ARMS Survey 1998
Corn manure surface 100 bushels * USDA ARMS Survey 1998
Corn manure inject 100 bushels * USDA ARMS Survey 1998
Soy fertilizer 100 bushels * USDA ARMS Survey 1998
Soy manure surface 100 bushels * USDA ARMS Survey 1998
Soy manure inject 100 bushels * USDA ARMS Survey 1998
Other fertilizer $ (VOP) * USDA ARMS Survey 1998
Other manure surface $ (VOP) * USDA ARMS Survey 1998
Other manure inject $ (VOP) * USDA ARMS Survey 1998
Hogs CWT. * USDA ARMS Survey 1998
* Estimated mean value varies by region and size of operation
Table A2. Output price,  ir P
Outputs Units Value Source
Corn (all) $/100 bushels 284 NASS – (average price 1997-99)
Soy (all) $/100 bushels 700 NASS – (average price 1997-99)
Other (all) - 1 -
Hogs $/cwt. 46.92 NASS –(average price 1997-99)
Table A3. Input price,  jr W
Inputs Units Value Source
Land $/acre 68.2 NASS Agricultural Land Values Final
Estimates 1998, Statistical Bulletin
Number 957 (national average) (use 7%
of land value as rental rate)
Capital $ 1 (by definition)
Feeder Pigs $/cwt 80.25 NASS – (average price 1997-99)
Feed Corn $/100 bushels 284 same as corn
Feed Soy $/100 bushels 700 same as soy
Fertilizer - N $/lb. 0.185 NRCS (and ERS, AER 824, p.35)1920
Table A4. Resource Use,  ijr A
Input-output Units Value Source
Land-corn acres/100 bushels * USDA ARMS Survey 1998
Land-soy acres/100 bushels * USDA ARMS Survey 1998
Land-other acres/$ * USDA ARMS Survey 1998
Capital-corn $/100 bushels 49.3 ERS Statistical Bulletin 974
Capital-soy $/100 bushels 127 ERS Statistical Bulletin 974-4
Capital-other Share of value 0.17 Same rate as corn
Capital-hogs $/CWT. * USDA ARMS Survey 1998
Feed corn-hogs 100 bushels /CWT. * USDA ARMS Survey 1998
Feed soy-hogs 100 bushels /CWT. * USDA ARMS Survey 1998
Feeder pigs-hogs CWT/CWT * USDA ARMS Survey 1998
Fertilizer-N-corn lbs./ 100 bushels 80.0 Manure application standard, Kellogg,
R.L., C.H. Lander, D. Moffitt, and N.
Gollehon.  2000.
Fertilizer-N-soy lbs./ 100 bushels 236.7 “”
Fertilizer-N-other lbs./ $ 0.282 Same rate as corn
* Estimated mean value varies by region and size of operation
Table A5.  Manure off-farm transportation net costs ($/CWT hog) by region and manure storage












Lagoon Uncover 1.33 1.36 2.01 2.15
Cover 5.32 5.38 6.57 6.83
Pit Surface 1.20 1.25 2.29 2.53
Inject 1.61 1.66 2.82 3.08
Source: Estimated. Base manure handling costs from Fleming et al. 1998.  Unit mile cost from
USDA, NRCS, 2003 Costs Associated with Development and Implementation of Comprehensive
Nutrient management Plans. Lagoon cover costs from Massey, et al. Agronomic and economic
impacts of lagoon based swine operations complying with the proposed EPA zero discharge rule.21



























Lagoon Uncover 1.53 7.21 0.42 7.62
Cover 5.07 2.69 1.39 4.08
Pit Surface 4.83 3.00 1.32 4.32
Inject 5.95 3.00 0.20 3.20
Source: US EPA National Emission Inventory-Ammonia Emission from Animal Husbandry
Operations, 2004.







Corn $/100 bu 8.87 8.28 53.00 49.70
Soybean $/100 bu 27.44 24.44 85.62 86.92
Other Share of value 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.17
Source: Estimated using EQIP program data, Farm Service Agency, USDA.22
Table 1. Production, Inputs, Nitrogen to Soil and Air, and Emission Technology under Four Policy Scenarios
1. Base 2. CAFO 3. CAFO+EQIP 4. Amm. N limit 5. CAFO+EQIP+Amm.N
% chg. % chg. % chg. % chg.
Hogs (mil. cwt.) 119.16 118.74 -0.35 118.88 -0.23 118.78 -0.31 118.01 -0.96
Corn – chem. fertilizer (mil. bu.) 106.14 106.29 0.15 106.04 -0.09 107.54 1.32 108.10 1.85
Corn – manure spread (mil. bu.) 58.97 66.41 12.60 63.93 8.40 50.59 -14.22 52.53 -10.94
Corn – manure inject (mil. bu.) 32.26 32.20 -0.19 32.60 1.07 40.79 26.45 41.42 28.39
Soybean – chem. fertilizer (mil. bu.) 47.91 47.69 -0.46 47.69 -0.44 47.86 -0.09 48.06 0.33
Soybean – manure spread (mil. bu.) 5.19 5.99 15.47 5.73 10.52 3.97 -23.43 4.17 -19.56
Soybean – manure inject (mil. bu.) 0.54 0.52 -2.81 0.53 -0.56 0.55 2.15 0.55 2.41
Other – chem. fertilizer (mil. $.) 98.02 87.35 -10.88 89.23 -8.97 94.42 -3.68 87.91 -10.31
Other – manure spread (mil. $.) 11.39 14.42 26.59 14.12 23.94 11.45 0.53 13.10 14.95
Other – manure inject (mil. $.) 7.25 6.36 -12.31 7.38 1.74 12.58 73.47 13.07 80.22
Land (mil. acres) 3.58 3.58 0.00 3.58 0.00 3.58 -0.06 3.58 -0.05
Capital (mil. $) 1116 1116 0.00 1116 0.00 1113 -0.30 1108 -0.71
Feeder pigs  (million cwt.) 16.60 16.54 -0.37 16.56 -0.24 16.54 -0.38 16.41 -1.16
Feed corn (mil. bu.) 671.55 669.29 -0.34 670.05 -0.22 669.42 -0.32 664.92 -0.99
Feed soybean (mil. bu.) 89.05 88.75 -0.34 88.85 -0.22 88.77 -0.32 88.17 -0.99
Chemical nitrogen (1000 tons) 113 111 -1.51 111 -1.35 113 0.00 113 -0.40
Revenue  (mil. $) 6645 6643 -0.04 6657 0.18 6625 -0.30 6610 -0.53
Input costs (mil. $) 2788 2789 0.02 2788 0.00 2784 -0.16 2759 -1.06
Total profits (mil. $) 3857 3720 -3.56 3801 -1.45 3583 -7.11 3524 -8.63
Hog operation profits (mil. $) 3191 3054 -4.30 3121 -2.20 2931 -8.15 2859 -10.41
Ammonia N - storage (1000 tons) 327.6 326.5 -0.34 326.9 -0.22 195.1 -40.43 193.8 -40.84
Ammonia N - field (1000 tons) 33.8 34.4 1.77 34.1 0.74 57.9 71.19 57.5 70.13
Ammonia N – total  (1000 tons) 361.4 360.9 -0.14 360.9 -0.13 253.0 -29.99 251.3 -30.46
Excess N - soil (1000 tons) 137.9 0.0 -100.00 0.0 -100.00 245.1 77.82 0.0 -100.00
Rate (factor of agronomic rate) 7.4 1.0 -86.42 1.0 -86.42 17.1 131.80 1.0 -86.42
Manure transport. costs  (mil. $) 0.0 134.0 - 136.0 - 0.0 0.00 142.7 -
Manure N on-farm (1000 tons) 183.8 50.1 -72.75 49.1 -73.30 290.4 58.05 46.9 -74.50
Manure N off-farm (1000 tons) 0.0 132.3 - 133.9 - 0.0 0.00 241.7 -
Cover (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 39.12 - 39.12 -
Inject (%) 25.56 24.19 -5.34 24.92 -2.48 32.91 28.76 32.68 27.8723
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